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I. Introduction 
Six years have passed since the Korean economy had experienced 
in December 1997 one of the most se디ous financial crisis in its 
modern history. The gro~πh rate of real GDP which had averaged 
6.9 percent during the pre-crisis period of 1993-7 declined sharply 
recording -6.7% in 1998. In retrospect. the financial crisis at the 
end of 1997 had forced 야le Korean society and its political 
economy to ch밍1ge drastically in many respects. Even though 야le 
Korean economy seems to have partially recovered by now , it may 
take many years to fully assess the entire socio-political impacts of 
its 1997 financial crisis. Most of all. the sharp reduction in real 
investment during the crisis period of 1997 and 1998 by -2.2 
percent and - 2 1.2 percent respectively has not been fully 
recovered during the post-crisis recovery period (1999-2002) with 
the annual average growth rate of 4.4 percent. This is a fairly 
sizable reduction in real investment when we compare it with the 
average annual growth rate of 9.1 percent during the pre-crisis 
period of 1993-6. Barro (2002) also points out that rates of 
economic growth in East Asia have rebounded in 1999-2000. but 
the permanence of this recovery is uncertain and that the failure of 
investment ratios to rebound significantly in the crisis coun:tries 
suggests that the crisis had a long-term adverse effect. 
In addition. the value system and the ways of conduct by all 
economic agents inclu며ng firms. households. 없ld government seem 
to have changed drastically since the crisis. Therefore. we may 
draw some important lessons from the short but painful recovery 
process of the Korean economy by conduc디ng a critical assessment 
on its post-crisis macroeconomic adjustments and reform progr밍ns. 
There have been voluminous discussions on the causes of the 
Korean crisis and the crisis resolution strate앓r. Chang and Velasco 
(1 998) and Radelet and Sachs (1 998) have argued that the Asian 
crisis was caused by the instability in international financial 
markets and the panicked. herd behavior of international investors 
and creditors with sudden shifts in market expecta디ons and 
confidence. On the other hand. Corsetti et a l. (1 998). Fischer (1 998) 
and Krugm잉1 (1998) have emphasized moral hazard in both 
corporate and financial sector as the primary cause of the financial 
crisis in Asia. However. the dominant view is that the interaction of 
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internal structural weaknesses with the instability of international 
financial markets was the primary cause of the Asian crisis (s년e 
Eichengreen (1 999). Haggard (2000). Chopra et a l. (2002). and IMF 
(2003)). 
In 앙o (200이. 1 defined the Korean model of economic de-
velopment before the financial crisis of 1997 as a model of 
monopolis디c competi디on across jndustries where government acts 
as both competition promoter and project monitor. In case of 
Korea. the government has deliberately introduced limited compe1J-
tion by lowering entry-barriers over time and by monitoring market 
failures by m메or conglomerates in order to maximize efficiency of 
limited resources. In other word딩. the government has played the 
role of competi디on promoter and supervision through government-
controllecl banks. which are part of quasi-internal organiza디on. [n 
this regard. the system has promoted monopolistic competition 
across industries. That is the reason why one observes in Kor건a 
larger number of automobile manufacturers. shipbuilders. airlines. 
oil refineries. semiconductor manufacturers. telecommunication 
equipment producers. ancl mobile phone companies etc. than those 
normally obseπed in many developing countries or smaller 
aclvancecl countries. 
The government policy protected bureaucrats from being blamed 
to be linked to one or two conglomerates interests but at the same 
time ‘ provided big conglomerates’ with irresistible incentives for 
horizontal diversification. The phenomenon of ‘ too-big to be failed' 
was set in because big conglomerates themselves were stockholclers 
of many financial institutions and the moral hazard in financial 
institutions started eroding their competi디veness. By 1997 , top :W 
conglomerates were producing over half of its GNP and top 5 
conglomerates' share reached one-third of the country's total 
production. 
However. this regulatory equilibrium of the Korean type was 
sustainable if and only if several preconditions were met. One such 
condition was the existence of strong government. which could 
regulate entry 밍ld exit of the firms in strategic industries and 
direct policy loans to these firms and which could allow almost 
indefinite access to policy loans to those firms who were allowed to 
remain in the industry. But the transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic one in Korea made it difficult for the regíme 
to maintain a strong hold on its ìndustrial p이icy. Another 
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precondi디on was the repressed labor market in favor of the 
owner-management corporate govemance structure. But the 
increasing demand for higher wages and benefits by org밍lized labor 
after the democratization movement ìn late 1980’s through at times 
violent disputes 와ld strikes has produced extra burden on firms' 
efforts for restructuring 없ld downsizing. But this condition became 
no longer viable as a result of Korea’s accession to wro and 
OECD. which required a full opening of Korea’s financial market. 
The last precon띠tion was the favorable intemational environment 
and the capacity of an efficient govemment to maintain stabilization 
policy under which such a regulatory equilibrium could be 
sustained. But in the period after the Plaza Accord. the vola디lity of 
exch밍1ge rates and investments has increased and a small open 
economy such as Korea has been increasingly vulnerable to real 
intemational business cycles. In case of Korea. the slowdown of the 
US economy and the stagnation in the Japanese economy have 
squeezed Korean firms' profitability 없ld have increased their 
debt-equity ra디os. In addition , the emergence of China and the 
resul디ng change in the interdependency in East Asia have pushed 
them to the brink of the collapse when the Korean govemment 
failed to maintain stabilization policy due to distributive poli디cs 
after the democratization movement. 
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the financial crisis in 
Korea and its post-crisis macroeconomic adjustment re찌ewing 
changing structure of interdependency in East Asia and to make a 
critical assessment on its post-crisis reform programs. Section 11 
reviews intemational environment 밍ld the vulnerability of the 
Korean economy during the period of 1985-97 before the financial 
crisis of 1997. The section examines the vola디lity of Koreas 
investment and net exports and the changing structure of Koreas 
interdependency \\깨삼1 Japan and China. In section III , a retroactive 
assessment on the 1997 financial crisis is made. Section IV 
examines macroeconomic adjustment in Korea during the post-cπsis 
period. Sec디on V presents an assessment on post-crisis reform 
progr밍ns. πle last section concludes the paper. 
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11. Internationa1 Linkage and Interdependency of the 
Korean Economy 
121 
Both the volatility of Koreas investment and net exports to 
foreign shocks 밍1d the changin당 structure of its interdependency 
with Japan and China have often been ignored in the assessment 
on Koreas macroeconomic fundamentals during the pre-crisis 
period. According to Nam and Iγ。(1 997). 야1e v이atility of major 
macroeconomic variables such as per-capita GDP measured in 
logarithm (y) ‘ per-capita consump디on expenditure in logarithm (cl, 
and per-capita investment in logarithm (i) and the ratio of net 
exports 1:0 GDP (NX/Y) in the Korean economy has declined over 
the year딩 but it was still relatively higher than those of the Unit.ed 
States and Japan at the beginning of 1990’s. 
1 have reexamined the v이a디lity of major macroeconomic variables 
for the period of 1970I-1997IV and 1998III-2002IV deleting first n \TO 
quarters of 1998 (19981 and 199811) immediately after the financ.al 
crisis in December 1997. The standard deviation of Korea’s GDP 
(2.0) was higher than those of US (1.09) and Japan (1. 43). Duri:1g 
the pre-crisis period the standard deviation of Korea’s ìnvestment 
(7. 18) was also significantly hi짱ler than those of US (2.49) and 
Japan (2.29). Lastly the standard dcviation of Korea’s ratio of n et 
exports to GDP (1 .61) was also much higher than those of US 
(0.85) and Japan (0.98). The relative vola디1띠 of Korea's major 
macroeconomic indicators continued to exist after the financial 
crisis even though its absolute volatility has been reduced. 
As shown in Table 1. the persistence of major macroeconomic 
variables measured by the first-order autocorrelation coefficients 
indicated that the persistence of GDP, consump디on and investment 
in Korea was almost the same as those ín the Uníted States and 
Japan. 
Fin외ly ， the procyclic떠 nature of consumption and investment 
was confirmed in a11 three economies by comparing coefficients of 
correlation with GDP but the degree of procyclicality of investment 
was higher in Korea than in US and Japan even after the financial 
crisis implyíng that investment in Korea continued to rema.in 
procyclical. On the other hand , the counter-cyclical nature of net 
exports was confirmed in only the US economy implyíng 삼1at export 
demand had positive impact on GDP in Korea and Japan but 
122 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
TABLE 1 
VOLATILIπ. PERSISTENCE AND CYCLICALIπ 。F MAJOR MACROECONOMIC 
INDICATORS: KOREA. US. AND JAPAN (1 970 1-2002 IV) 
Volatillty of Real Macroeconomic Indicators 
Pre-crisis period Post-crisis period 
(1970 1-1997 IV) (1 998 III -2002 IV) 
0'(ν) O'(c) 0'(0 O'(NX/Y) O'(y) O' (c) 0'(0 O' (NX/ Y) 
Korea 2.00 1.58 7.18 1.61 1. 15 1.03 2.96 1.54 
us 1.09 0.87 2 .49 0.85 1.03 0 .93 1.86 0 .64 
Japan 1.43 1.68 2.29 0.98 0.91 1.26 1.25 0.47 
。(c)/a(y) a(i) /aωl a(NX/Y) /a(y) a(c)/a(y) a(i)/a(y) 。(NX/Y)/a(y)
Korea 0.78 3.58 0.80 0.89 2.56 1.33 
us 0.80 2.29 0.78 0.90 1.81 0.62 
Japan 1. 17 1.60 0.68 1.38 1.37 0.52 
First Order Correlation Coefficients 
Pre-crisis period Post-crisis period 
(1970 1-1997 I\끼 (1 998 II1-2002 1\끼 
p(y) p (c) p(i) p(NX/ Y) p (ν) p(c) p (i) p(NX/ Y) 
Korea 0 .973 0.974 0 .974 0.868 0.833 0.833 0.832 0 .835 
us 0 .974 0.975 0.970 0.941 0.832 0.833 0.827 0.831 
Japan 0.970 0.968 0.971 0 .934 0.834 0.838 0.832 0 .836 
Coefficients of Correlation with GDP (y) 
Pre -crisis period Post-crisis pe디od 
(1970 1- 1997 IV) (1998 III-2002 1\끼 
p (c.y) p(i ‘y) p(NX/Y.y) p(c.y) p (i.ν) p(NX/Y.y) 
Korea 0.996 0.989 0.228 0 .989 0.916 0.559 
us 0.999 0.989 -0.494 0.979 0.209 -0.956 
Japan 0 .998 0.993 0.203 0.711 0 .899 0 .623 
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negative impact on GDP in US 
Nam and Pyo (1 997) has applied a three-country international 
real business cycles model of the Backus. Kehoe. and Kydland 
(1992) type and presents the following simulation results. Korea 
has benefited from favorable innovation shocks of the United States 
and Japan by sho띠ng increased GDP and investment. In particu 
lar. the posi디ve impact of favorable innovation shock from the US 
was greater than that of Korca’s own innovation shock. Thcrcforc. 
the slower economic growth during 19!) 1-5 in the United States 
with average annual growth rate of GDP being 2 .4 percent and the 
rapid contraction in Japan during the same period with average 
annual 땅rowth rate of GDP being only 1.4 percent must have 
adversely affected on the Korean economy of which corporate sector 
was already suffering from lower rates of return and high debt 
equity ra디o. 
On the other hand. we can evaluate the changing nature of 
Korea’s industrial interdependency with ,Japan and China. Lee and 
Okamoto (2002) reports the structural change in indusirial 
interdependency among Japan. China and Korea using an 
international input-output framework. They have adopted the 
Hypothetical Extraction Method (HEM) and Leontief inverse matrix 
decomposition technique to analyze the structure of industrial 
interdependency among three E:ast Asian economies of Japan. 
China and Korea. 
Table 2 presents their estimation result of changes in trade 
linkage effects among the three economies for the years of 1985. 
1990 and 1995 when international 10 Tables were availab.e. 
Regarding Japan. for example. as extracted country. Japan h :ts 
maintain건d rela디vely stable trade linkage effects. Its feedback effects 
remained stable around 60 percent of total trade linkage effect 
during the period of 1985-95. lts trade linkage effect with China 
and Korea has remained around 25 percent and 15 percent. China 
has declined its trade linkage with Japan from 59 percent in 1985 
to 36 percent and 39 percent in 1990 and 1995 respectively. On 
the other hand ‘ Korea’s feedback effect has marginally increased 
from 31 percent in 1985 to 37 percent in 1995 and decreased its 
trade dependence on Japan from 69 percent in 1985 to 48 percent 
in 1995. But its dependence on China as trading partner increasl~d 
sharply from 1 percent in 1985 to 15 percent in 1995. 
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TABLE 2 
CHANGES IN TRADE LINKAGE EFFECTS lN EAST AslA 
Extracted Country 
Ch1na Japan Korea 
China 41% 24% 1% 
1985 Jap없1 59% 63% 69% 
Korea 0% 12% 31% 
Trade Linkage 100% 100% 100% 
China 60% 25% 0% 
1990 Japan 36% 56% 66% 
Korea 4% 19% 33% 
Trade Lir나‘age 100% 100% 100% 
China 47% 25% 15% 
1995 
Jap하1 39% 60% 48% 
Korea 14% 15% 37% 
Trade Linkage 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Lee and Okamoto (2002). 
The ratio of Korea’s trade dependence from Japan to China has a 
significant ìmplication for Korea’s macroeconomic adjustment. While 
the Chinese Yuan had been pegged to US dollar and the Japanese 
Yen had been depreciated against dollar by 22.6 percent between 
1995 and 1997. the Korean Won had not been fully depreciated 
and had been relatively overva1ued: In December 1994. 암le 
exchange rate was 79 1.9 Won per dollar but it was appreciated to 
the level of 757 won by July 1995 and then by December 1996 it 
depreciated to the level of 839 won per dollar. ln other words. the 
Korean Won was depreciated only by 6 .0 percent between December 
1994 없ld December 1996. This lack of correspondence between the 
shift in trade dependence 없ld the real equ i1ibrium exchange rate in 
East Asia must have been another cause of the 1997 financial 
crisis in East Asia. 
111. The 1997 F‘inancia1 Crisis in Korea: A Retroactive 
Assessment 
The financial crisis in Korea. which was developed in 
November-December of 1997 was truly a shock not only to 
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domestic residents but also to many intemational investors and 
institutions such as Intemational Monetary Fund and World bank 
because of its sudden nature and the magnitude of the subsequerlt 
bail-out program. Chopra et a l. (2002) admit the fact that market 
par디cipants including the Fund and other intemational organi 
zations. credit rating agencies. and investors were unable to predict 
the crisis in Korea. They conclude that the Korean experience 
suggests that crisis prediction frameworks should pay greater 
attention to structural vulnerabilities and microeconomic perfor-
mance. The recent report by Independent Evaluation office of the 
IMF (2003) has also concluded that IMF surveillance was less 
effective :ln Korea identifYing specìfic weaknesses in the country but 
underestima디ng their seriousness and thereby failing to provide 
sufficient waming. But it will be difficult to identifY any 
quantifiable indicators to account for these factors. 1 propose in the 
present paper to include the growth rates of reserve base (bank 
notes and coins issued and reserve deposits of Deposit Monetary 
Banks (DMB) in the list of such indicators. 
In order to understand why the eleventh largest economy in 
gross national product was suddenly subject to contagion and 
national bankruptcy. we need more than a simple model of moral 
hazard or cronyism. After searching for altemative plausible 
theoretical models. 1 have selected in Pyo (200이 the excess 
competition model developed by the modem theorists of industrial 
org라lization such as Scherer (1 98이. Okuno-Fujiwara et a l. (1 980). 
Okuno-Fujiwara (1 988). Stiglitz (1 981). Suzumura and Kiyono 
(1987). amd Itoh et a l. (1988). They have argued that measures 
taken to stimulate compe디tion could result in inefficient equilib-
rium. In particular. Itoh et a l. 11988) have shown that from the 
standpoint of national economic welfare. it may be desirable for 
govemment to regulate entry to the industry if the industry is 
characterized by a Coumot-Nash oligopoly. Assuming that each firm 
in the industry behaves in a Coumot-Nash fashion and the 
govemmεnt can regulate the entry to the industry but cannot 
enforce for each firm marginal-cost pricing. they show that the 
number of firms established in the long-run Coumot-Nash 
equilibrium with free entry and e잉t exceeds the so-called 
second-best number of firms established as a result of maximizing 
total social surplus (the sum of consumer’s and producer’S 
surplus). 까ley define it as excess compe디디on 밍ld dis디nguish it 
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from excessive competition. which refers to a compe디디ve (not 
oligopolistic) industry with free entry. but where exit does not 
rapidly occur when excess capacity arises 하ld in which labor 
mobility is low. 
The excess compe디디on model implies that when the number of 
firms in a Coumot-Nash oligopoly increases. the ch밍1ge does not 
always improve welfare. It also implies that as a resuIt of the 
autonomous entry and exit of p다vate firms. there is the possibili양 
of excessive entry relative to the second-best number of firms. The 
model seπed as a jus디fication for cartels and govemment 
regulations on entry to particular industry in Jap없1 since the end 
of the war. It can be also applied to the industrial development in 
Korea. But we should note that such a second-best Coumot-Nash 
equilibrium becomes an optimal one if and only if the government 
knows when 와ld how to regulate the entry 밍ld exit. If for some 
reasons. there is a policy failure. the second best equilibrium is not 
necessarily a welfare-maximizing equilibrium even under the oligop-
이y. Suppose for ex밍nple that the Jap밍lese model of regula디on 
was more consensus-based among bureaucrats and industrialists 
than the Korean model. Then it would be more likely for the 
Korean regulatory system to be m하laged on an ad hoc base rather 
than on consensus building. 
In addition. the excess competition model implicitly assumes a 
perfect capital market so that once the op디mal number of firms is 
established. each firm has a ready access to capital market or is 
bailed out if it runs into financial trouble. In other words. in such 
equilibrium. it will be optimal to bail out such firm because the 
govemment is supposed to keep the optimal number of firms in the 
oligopolis디c industry. πle other alternative would be to allow an 
exit of the firm 없ld simultaneously allow an entry of another firm. 
which will entail transaction costs. Such an implicit assump디on of 
perfect capital market limits the usefulness of the excess 
compe디디on model. If the financial sector is opera디ng under moral 
hazard and if the government is lobbied or bribed by interest 
groups. then the second-best equilibrium cannot be maintained. In 
this regard. it is not s따prising to observe the c이lapse of such a 
regulatory equilibrium in a period of transition from an authoritar-
ian regime to a less-authoritarian or democratic one. 
When we estimated Harberger’s before-tax gross rate of retum 
(gross opera디ng surplusjgross capital stock) in OECD countries in 
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FIGURE 1 
GROSS RATES OF RETURN ON CAPJTAL IN G 7 COUNTRIES AND K OREA 
머O 뻐d Nam (1 999) , two outliers had maintained extremely high 
rates of return: Korea maintaining 33.7% in 1971 . as shown in 
Pigure 1. 17.2% in 1981 and J apan maintaining 3 1.2% in 197 1 
and 16.7% ìn 1981 respec디vely. Japan's rate of return s tarted 1.0 
f외1 stead.ily but remarkably after 1990 ultimately converging 1.0 
OECD average by 1994. But Koreas rate of return reveals a faster 
rate of convergence. In particular . i1. fell veη sharply after 1990 
and reached 9 .9 percent by 1994 . which was lower than Japarls 
rate of return (1 1.9%) 없ld the average of 10 OECD countries of 
which data were available (1 0 .2%). Therefore. the systemic ris k 
inherent in Korean companies excessive borro삐ng and low ra te C)f 
retum proceeded well before the 1997 cris is. 
The f:려ling rates of return on both assets 하ld equi앙 have been 
observed by Krueger and Yoo (2002) and Joh (2001) . Krueger and 
Yoo (2002) have shown that retum on assets by Big 30 Chaebo !.s 
in all sectors has declined from 3 .35 percent in 1995 to - 0 .87 
percent in 1997. Returns on equi양 by Big 30 Chaebols has al~，o 
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l •- Reserve Mon양 Growth Rate I 
Source: The Bank of Korea. Monthlμ Bulletin. Selected Years. 
FIGURE 2 
RESERVE MONEY: GROWfH RATE (1992.1-2002.12) 
declined sharply from 15.26 percent to - 4.83 percent during the 
S하ne period. Joh (2001) has shown that the average rate of retum 
on equi양 was often lower 야lan 삼le cost of capita1. forc1ng them to 
fmance 1nterest payments by incurring additiona1 debt. Joh (2002) 
has a1so shown that the performance of the Chaebols was lower 
than that of independent firms. 
Then a question remains as to why Korean Chaebols have 
pursued excessive competi디on and pre-emptive overinvestment 
around 1995. One plausible explana디on is that Korean Chaebols 
have overreacted to accession to wro and OECD by m와당ng 
overinvestment in non-tradable sectors such as retail and large 
merchandise network and pre-emp디ve investment in some tradable 
sectors such as automobile and steel m킹lufacturing (see Fγ。
(2000)). 
Since the domestic ftnancia1 industries interest rates (13.8%. 
corporate bond rate in 1995) were much hi방ler than internationa1 
prime rates (5.66%, Eurodollar rate in 1995), m하ly Chaebol firms 
went after short-term borrowing from abroad and over-borro뻐ng 
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from domestic banks and non-bank financial intermediaries by 
means of cross-guaran디es of loans among their subsidiaries. The 
net consequence of this spree of over-investment under excessive 
borrowin땅 is the domestic credit ‘c:runch and the mismatch betwe션n 
long-terrn assets and short-term foreign debt. 
The sign of domestic credit crunch preceded well before the 
financial crisis which began frorn the end of November 1997. A 
rapid contraction of reserve base started to occur during the first 
quarter of 1996. eighteen months prior to the December 1997 
currency attack as shown in Figure 2. The average balance of 
reserve base in nominal terms was at peak in 1996 (24.8 trillion 
won) but declined vel}' rapidly in subsequent years: 1997 (21. 1 
trillion won). and 1998 (1 9.6 tri.llion won). It started to increa3e 
only in 1999 (22.0 trillion won) ,md 2000 (26.4 trillion won) after 
the injec1Jon of massive public funds (1 17.9 trillion won by the end 
of 2000) to salvage failing banks and corporate sector. In other 
words. the domestic credit crunch as a resuIt of large-scale 
corporate bankruptcies such as Hanbo Steel, Kia Automobile. and 
Sammi 딩teel etc. started well in advance of the actual currency 
attack. As the domestic credit crunch spreads out sending the 
signal to the market that there is no longer too-big to fail 
phenomena and that the Korean govemment is not going to bail 
out big con밍omerates. the remaining companies 없ld banks went 
for short-term foreign loans to solve their liquidity problems 
worsening the mismatch between short-term liability and long-term 
assets. 
IV. Macroeconomic Adjustment in the Post-Crisis 
Recovery in Korea 
After the financial crisis in December 1997. the Korean ecoIiomy 
went through a turbulent period of painful adjustment. But in 
retrospec t. the V-shaped recoverγ in Korean economy has been 
faster and broader than those observed in most of crisis-inflicted 
economies as observed by Chopra et a l. (2002). Hong. Lee. and 
Rhee (2002) has 떠so shown that Koreas contraction and recoveπ 
were sharper than most of other post-crisis recoveries. 
πle macroeconomic adjustment during the first half of 1998 
immediately following IMF-led bail out of the record amount (U상$ 
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57 billion) was rather turbulent and controversial. At the initial 
stage , IMF mandated the Korean Govemment to pursue ultra-디ght 
monetary policy and tight fiscal policy which has been a sort of 
standard prescription for the crisis-inflicted economies. 
For this reason , the hi함1 interest p이icy at the initial stage of the 
Fund program may have contributed to stabilizing 삼le exchange 
rate but at the s없ne 디me， may have aggravated the sharp cutback 
in domestic demand as emphasized in Pyo (2003). For the s밍ne 
reason , the sudden imposition of the BIS standard (minimum 8 
percent rule of maintaining banks own capital) was not a realistic 
go떠 for the economy which had maintained 33-37.5 percent 
domestic savings rate , 34-40 percent ratio of gross domestic 
investment 밍ld high debt-to-equity ratio (524 percent for the big-30 
conglomerates , 467 percent for the big-5 and 350 percent for 
Non-chaebol comp밍1Ïes as of end of 1997). But as the exchange 
rate became stabilized by the end of the second quarter of 1998. 
IMF and the Korean government agreed to lower interest rates and 
increase govemment spending. 
As summarized in Table 3. major macroeconomic indicators 
characterize the nature of the post-crisis recovery in Korea. The 
main engine of growth was the expansionary fiscal policy with 
massive injection of public funds. From 1998 to 2002 , the 
government expenditure has grown at an average annual rate of 
24.8 percent, while it had grown at an average annual rate of 19.6 
percent during 1993-7. The ratio of govemment expenditure to GDP 
has increased from 18.3 percent in 1993 to 22.9 percent on 2002. 
At the same 디me ， we can point out that the post-crisis recovery 
IS 외so characterized by consump디on-led recovery mainly helped by 
injection of public funds and lower interest rate policy rather than 
investment-led recovery. As can be seen from Table 3. consumption 
expenditure has grown steadily (9.4%. 6.7%. 3.7% , and 6.2% 
during 1999-2002). while gross fixed investment has not grown 
steadily (3.7%. 11 ,4%, • 1.8%. and 4.8% during 1999-2002). 
Another channel of the fast recovery was the depreciation of won 
during 1998. In terms of period average. won per US dollar has 
depreciated as much as 47 percent from 1997 to 1998. The 
nominal effective exchange rate of won per dollar has depreciated 
by 34 percent during 야le s밍ne period. Even though both exchange 
rates have been somewhat moderated and appreciated during the 
period of 1998-2000. the earψ adjustment of nominal exchange 
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TABLE 3 
S UMMARY MACROECONOMIC IND1CATORS. KOREA: 1993-2002 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 200:! 
Real GDP(percent change) 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 -6.7 10.9 9 .3 3 .1 6.3 
Fina1 domes Uc demand 5 .7 8.4 9.5 7.3 1.2 -13.8 7.4 7.7 2.5 5.8 
ConsumpUon 5 .4 7.1 8.2 7.2 3.2 - 10.1 9 .4 6.7 3 .7 6.2 
Gross fl.xed lnvestmenl 6.3 10.7 11.9 7.3 -2.2 -2 1.2 3.7 11.4 . 1.8 4.5 
Savlng and Investment(ln percent of GDP) 
Gross naUona] saving 36.2 35.5 35.5 33.8 33.4 33.9 32.9 32 .4 29.9 29.2 
Cross domestic Investment 35.4 36.5 37 .3 38.1 34.4 2 1.3 26.9 28.3 26.8 26.1 
Prices(percent change) 
Consumer prices(average) 4 .8 6.3 4.5 4 .9 4.4 7 .5 0 .8 2.3 4. 1 2.7 
Consumer prlce{end-period) 5.8 5.6 4.8 4 .9 6.6 4 .0 1.4 2.8 3.2 3.7 
GDP defla l.or 7.0 7.6 7.2 3.9 3.2 5.0 -2.0 - 1.1 1.3 1.7 
Employment and wages 
Unemployment rate 2 .8 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.6 6 .8 6.3 4 .1 3.7 3.1 
Wages. m anufactllring 
(annual pe rcenl c hangel 10.9 15.5 9 .9 12 .2 5.2 -3. 1 14.9 8.6 5.8 12.1) 




18.6 19.1 19.3 20.4 20.6 2 1.8 22.4 26.0 26.4 26.13 
18.3 18.7 19.0 20.2 22. 1 26.0 25.1 24.8 25.1 22 .!’ 
0 .3 0 .4 0.3 0.3 - 1.5 -4 .2 -2.7 1.3 1.3 3.7 
Money and credit(end of perlod) 
M3 19.0 24.7 19.1 16.7 139 12.5 8.0 7. 1 11 .6 1 3샤 










































































Balaoce of payments(ln blllioos of U .S. dollars) 
Exporls . fob 
Imports. fob 
82.1 95.0 124.6 130.0 138.6 132.1 145.2 175.9 15 1.4 162 .!> 
79.8 97.8 129.1 144.9 14 1.8 90.5 116.8 159.1 138.0 152 . 1 
Current accounl balance 1.0 -3.9 -8.5 -23 .0 -8.3 40.4 24.5 12.2 8 .2 6.1 
Cllrrent account balance 
(In percent of COP) 0 .3 - 1.0 - 1.7 -4.4 -1.7 12.7 6.0 2.7 2 .0 I .:~ 
fTable C ontinued) 
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2α)2 
Usable gross reseπes 
In bllllons of U.S. 
dollars (end of per1od) 18.3 22.4 29.4 29.4 8.9 48.5 74.1 96.2 102.8 121 .4 
In months of Imports 
of goods 와Id services 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 0.7 6.5 7.6 7.1 8.7 8.2 
Externa1 debt 
ln billions of U.S. 
dollars 43.9 97.4 127.5 163.5 159.2 148.7 137.1 131.7 118.8 131.0 
In percenl of GDP 12.7 24.2 26.0 31.4 33.4 46.8 33.8 28.5 27.9 27.5 
Exchange rate(perlod average) 
Won per U.S. dollar 802.7 803.4 77 1.0 804.8 951.1 1398.9 1189.5 1130.6 1290.8 1251.2 
NomInal effecUve 
excharlge rale 
(l995- 100. W/$) 100.4 100.5 100 .。 98.7 108.0 144.7 13 1.1 123.3 132.6 n.a. 
Real effecUve 
exchange rale 102.9 100.9 100 .。 97.9 106.8 133.7 122.3 114.6 121.7 n.a 
(l 995- 100. W/$) 
Notes: 1) Excluding privatiza디on receipts. 
2) Prior to 2000. the civil seπice pension is excluded. 
3) Including governrnent guaranteed restructuring bonds issued by 
KDIC and KAMCO. 
4) Exclu띠ng deposits at overseas branches 없ld subsidiaries of 
domestlc banks. 
5) Including ofTshore borrowing of domestic fì.nancial ins섭tu디ons and 
debt contracted by overseas branches of domestic financial 
institu디ons. 
Source: The Bank of Korea. Pri.ncipal Economic lndicators and National 
Accounts. 2002. 
rates in 1998 has helped Korean firms to recover its competi-
tiveness. In par디cular. the boom in Information. Communication. 
and Techn이ogy (ICT) sector in the United States and other 
industrial economies and the sustained growth of the Chinese 
economy has helped Korean manufacturers of semiconductors. 
steel. automobile. and other ICT-related commodìties to improve 
their export performance. 
The export volume has grown at an average annual rate 17.3 
percent during the three year perìod (1998-200이 of recovery. But 
as the ICT boom calmed down in 2001. 1ts grm따h rate has been 
sharply reduced to 0.7 percent and 14.9 percent respec디vely in 
2001 and 2002. Korea’s impressive export performance durìng 삼le 
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TABLE 4 
GROSS O UTPUT GROWfH ACCOUNTING FOR KOREA (1 984-2000) 
(Growth Ra tes (%) per Annum) 
: 
Growth Capl ta1 Labor Energy Materia1 TFP 
output Input Input Input Input 
1. Agriculture 1.66 7.10 -2.43 4.70 2.07 -2.85 
2. coal m1ning -10.37 -2.46 -1 1.90 -9.66 -7.81 -0.B6 
3 . Meta1 non-metal 3.75 -15.95 -5.90 5 . 11 4 . 12 10.í'6 
4. Oil and gas 0.00 -0 .85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
5 . Construction 5.40 13.08 7.01 -3.53 5.18 - 1.딘5 
6 . Food 3.07 7.73 0.90 3 .06 2.75 -0.딩2 
7. Textile 2.30 5.19 -5.08 2 .70 1.01 1.딩2 
8 . Apparels 3.54 4.10 -6.98 3 .45 3.60 l.í'2 
9 . lumber 없ld wood 6.70 4.63 -5.22 5.65 5.56 2.62 
10. Fumiture 9 .49 10.28 -2.21 8 .02 9 .02 2. 16 
1 1. paper allied 6.84 13.06 0.50 6 .38 6.33 0. 19 
12. printing. publishlng. aUied 7.88 8.09 2 .22 5.83 8.16 1. ~:2 
13. Chemicals 7.94 11.48 -0.01 9 .94 7.46 0.25 
14. petroleum products 6.04 11.79 -0 .01 3.76 6.12 O.딘 1 
15. Lea야ler 0.38 0.70 -20.38 1.19 -0.37 4 .07 
16. stone. clay. glass 6.48 9 . 14 -2.27 3.59 6 .54 1.27 
17. prirnary me떠l 7.29 9 .10 3 .33 5 .24 6.84 O.딛 1 
18. fabricated metal 7.38 1 1.96 0.09 5.86 6.32 1. ~:6 
19. Machlnery 10.68 7.58 5.67 8.02 10.59 1.딩9 
20. electrical machinery 14.24 14.40 -1.99 9.66 14.13 2 .13 
21. Motor 14.39 12.05 5.08 7 .16 15.22 1. ] 2 
22. σ없lsportaUon eq띠p 3.05 2 1.29 5.08 -10.88 3 .66 -2.66 
23. Instrument 10.87 11.01 0.80 7 .67 11.05 1.64 
24. Rubber 11.39 12.07 -4 .76 11.85 11. 19 2.딩9 
25. misc.m없1Ufacturing 1.53 23.95 -5.59 1.74 1.02 -2.20 
26. σansporta디on 6 .66 7.12 2 .55 4 .79 8.59 O.Ei8 
27. corrununication 13.66 12.29 2.54 10.13 17.67 3 .4.1 
28. electric utility 6.65 8 .28 7.07 2.93 8.53 -0 .02 
29. gas u버ity 17.44 17.90 7.06 19.63 10.49 1.2 2 
30. Trade 8.19 12.16 11.37 6.18 10.00 -2.~'3 
31. Finance and real estate 13.54 8.09 9.07 13.74 14.07 3.E,5 
32. other private seπice 8 .85 11.86 9 .91 8.73 9 . 12 - 1. 17 
33. Public seπice 7.46 11.36 1.81 0.35 2.06 5 .4 1 
Total 8 .32 9.96 2 .49 6 .05 8 .21 1.(14 
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post-crisi:s recovery period has helped the economy in improving 
balance of payments. reducing foreign debt and accumula디ng 
usable gross reseπes. 
In order to identifY whether there was a structural break in the 
Korean economy around 1997. we have conducted a preliminary 
growth accoun디ng 밍ld producti찌ty analysís for Korea (1 984-2000) 
in Pyo. Rhee. and Ha (2003). The gross output (YO) of éùl 
industries has grown at the average annual rate of 8.32 percent 
while capital (K). labor (L). energy (E). 없ld material input (M) have 
gro\\π1 at the rate of 9.96 percent. 2.49 percent. 6.05 percent. and 
8.21 perc:ent respectively during the pe디od as summarized in Table 
4. The average estimated shares of four inputs were 0.21 (vK). 0.20 
(vLl. 0.08 (vE) and 0.51 (vM) respectively. The economy-wide gro~11 
rate of tota1 factor productivity (T.FP) has been estimated to be 1.04 
percent. 'Therefore. the relative contribution of TFP to output gro~11 
is estimated to be 12.5 percent. which is of rather significælt 
magnitude rejec디ng the Krugm밍l’s (1994) proposi디on and earlier 
empirical fin이ngs by Young (1 994) and Lau 윈ld Kim (1 994). 
We have generated a series of labor productivity; gross output 
per employee (YO/L). During the period of 1984-2000. the growth 
rates of economy-wide output per employee was 5.98 percent. πle 
trends in labor producti띠ty are shown in Figure 3. 
We have also generated a sertes of capital-output coefficients; 
capita1-gross output coefficients (K/YO) as shown in Figure 4. The 
economy-wide capita1-output coefficient has grown at average 
annual rate of 1.59 percent. πle economy-wide capita1-labor ratio 
has gro\\께 at 7.57 percent. Bot11 capi떠l-gross output coefficient 
and capi떠l-GDP coefficient started to fall after 1998 implying that 
there was a structural change after the financial crisis in 1997. 
v. The lPost-Crisis Structural Reforms in Korea 
The structural reforms initiated by the Korean govemment in the 
post-crisis period can by categorized into financial restructuring 
reforms. corporate reforms and reforms in industrial relations. 
A. Fïnancial Restructu，다ng R，앙orms 
As of end of October 2002. t.he financial restructuring status 
reported by the Korean Public Fund Oversight Committee (KPFOC) 
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TABLE 5 
RESTRucrURlNG OF FINANClAL INSTITUTIONS AND USES 
AND SOURCES OF PuBLlC FuNDS 
C1assificatlon 
Restructurtng 
Ucense8 •• _ 018s01u- Total (B/ A) 
Revoked Mergers tions (B) (%) 
5 9 - 14 42.4 
121 150 361 632 30.0 



























































































































































0 .5 20.9 
1.1 1.9 
38.7 157.1 
24 .4 85.9 
1.6 2 1.5 
8 .3 16.0 
1.8 20.8 
2.4 
0 .2 8 .1 
11.9 68.8 
2 .4 2 .4 
38 .7 157.1 
Note: MB- Merchant Banks. ITC- Investment and Trust Companies. SC-
Securitles Companies. IC- Insurance Comp없1ies. MS- Mutual Sa:띠ng 
없ld Finance Companies. CU- Credit Unions. 없ld LC-냥asing Companies. 
Source: The Korean Public Fund Oversight Committee. Intemet Homepage. 
October 2002. 
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indicates there have been significant restructuring in both ban때ng 
and non .. banking sector. As summarized in Table 5 ‘ out of 딩3 
banks as of the end of 1997. 5 b,mks' licenses were revoked and 9 
banks were merged into other banks. With the new entry of one 
bank. the total number of banks has been reduced to 20 banks. 
Among non-bank financial institut.ions. 18 merchant banks' licenses 
have been. revoked and 6 merchant banks have been merged. The 
total number of non-banks has been reduced from 2.068 íns디t11-
tions to 1.498 institutions during the same period. The policy 
instrument in financial restructuring reforms has been the injection 
of public funds in the form of thε payment of insured deposits and 
recapitalization into troubled financial institutions by Korea Depm,it 
Insurance Corporation (KDIC) 없1(:1 in the form of the purchase of 
their non-performing loans (NPL) by the Korea Asset Management 
Corpora디on (KAMC). During the lìve-year period of November 1997 
to October 2002. a total of 157 trillion won has been injected. The 
two-thirds of the public funds injected were raised by the issuance 
of bonds by KDIC and KAMC. Only less than 20 percent (32.2 
trillion son) has been repaid by Odober 2002. 
Most of banking reforms have been undertaken in the form of 
purchases and assumption (P&H) rather than liquidation and 
merger and acquisi디on (M&A) to shorten the li디ga디on time. The 
representative case is Korea First Bank which was sold to New 
Bridge Capital consortiums. But it was a controversial deal because 
the Korean govemment made a blanket commitment of assuming 
responsibility for all current and future NPLs. The financial 
authorities suspended 14 merchant banks in December 1997 ‘ Their 
assets and liabilities were transferred to a bridge bank. The net 
consequences of resσucturing in the b없lking sector can be seen by 
the selected indicators of commercial banks as shown in Table 6. 
Accordin당 to Korean Financial Supervisory Service. the total 
number of employees have been reduced by 40 percent by 2002 
and that of branches by 20 percent by 2000. The ratio of no ‘11-
performing loans (NPL) in total loans has been reduced from the 
peak of 딩.3 percent in 1999 to 1.9 percent in 2002. Both retum on 
asset (ROA) including trust accounts and retums on equity (ROE) 
have improved from 0.9 percent 밍ld 14.2 percent respec디vely in 
1997 to 0.6 percent and 11.7 percent respectively in 2002. The BIS 
ratio has also improved from 7.0 i.n 1997 to 10.5 in 2002. 
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TABLE 6 
SELECTED lNDlCATORS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
(Unit: 100 Mil .. Person. Bill. Won. %) 
Year _ No. of No. of 
Delinquency 
NPLs NPLRatio of ROA n” ROE BIS Employees Branches Ratjodi ard Rado credit c 
1996 103.913 5.105 118.739 4.1 n.a. 0.3 3.8 9 .1 
1997 113.994 5.987 226.521 6.0 n.a. -0.9 -14.2 7.0 
1998 75.677 5.056 212.160 7.4 n.a. -3.3 -52.5 8.2 
1999 74.744 4.780 273.938 8.3 6.8 -1.3 -23.1 10.8 
2000 70.559 4.709 238.912 6.6 7.7 -0.6 -1 1.9 10.8 
2001 68.360 4.776 109.760 2.9 7.5 0.8 15.9 10.8 
2002 66.880 5.016 90.407 1.9 11.9 0.6 11.7 10.5 
Note: 1) ROA includes trust accounts. 
Source: Financial Supeπisory Seπice. Monthlν Financial Statistics BuUetin. 
Various Issues. 
While financial reforrns look impressive in numbers of ban립ng 
institutions. which were subject to restructuring schemes. there 
have been several problems in the way the reforrn progr하ns have 
been implemented. The most serious problem was lack of transpar-
ent criteria by which a certain troubled financial institution was 
forced to close down or was bailed out by 야le injection of the 
public funds . For example. in June 1998 the financial authorities 
closed down five banks at which BIS capital adequacy ratio 띠d not 
meet eight percent level at the end of 1997. But seven other banks. 
which did not meet the required adequacy ratio , were allowed to 
survive cas다ng doubt on transparency of the decision on the bank 
closure. In addition , the rapid switch from corporate loans to con-
sumer loans by commercial banks parucularly in the forrn of credit 
card loans and real estate loans has invited another forrn of moral 
hazard on consumer side 없ld the delinquency ratio of credit cards 
has increased from 6 .8 percent in 1999 to 1 l.9 percent in 2002. 
Other problems include high concentration ratio in ban퍼ng 
sector and increased bank ownership by the government as the 
consequence of re-capitalization by the public funds . The ratio of 
top 야rree banks' assets to the total assets of all banks exhibited a 
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big jump in 1998 and remained relatively stable thereafter. 1\vo 
troubled commercial banks. Koreεl First Bank and Seoul Bank had 
been nationalized and the shares of govemment in such 
commercial banks as Choheun당 Bank. Woori Bank. and Korea 
Exchange Bank have increased as the public funds had been 
injected. 까lerefore. the room for moral hazard was expanded rather 
than being reduced. 
B. Corporate R，망orms 
As summarized in Chopra et a l'. (2002). the strategy for corporate 
restructuring had three main elements: promoting greater com 
peti디on ， improving corporate governance. and improving capital 
structure and profitability. In order to promote greater competiticn. 
steps to liberalize the capital markets and the foreign investment 
regime were implemented. 
The liberalization of capitaI market contributed to the strong 
inflows of portfolio and foreign direct investment and to the swit:::h 
from short-term borrowing by domestic corpora디ons and financ ial 
institutions to long-term borrowin뜸 in 1998. For improvin당 corporale 
governance. the Commercial Code and Securities and Exchange Act 
was reformed in February 1998. In April 2000. the top 30 Chaebol 
were required for the first time to produce combined financial 
statements that net out intra-group transactions. thereby produci l1g 
a more complete picture of corporate health (Chopra et a l. 2002. p. 
71). 
Finally. to improve capital structure and profitability. Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC) was given full responsibility Jor 
overseeing the restructuring of the corporate sector. Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC) was given more power to enforce rules against 
illegaI intra-Chaebol transactions. In October 2000. corporatc 
restructuring vehicle (CRV) systern was introduced to facilitate the 
transfer of distressed assets to inventory. But progress has been 
slow in resolving firms under count-supervised insolvencies. In 
1997. there were thirteen Chaebols which went under count-
supervised restructuring. Except Kia Motors which was purchased 
by Hyundai Motors. few have been sold or liquidated yet. Chopra el 
a l. (2002) has evaluated the achievements in corporate reforms as 
mLxed: there has been some restructuring. but not enough given 
the scale of the problem. and there are still significant weaknes"es 
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TABLE 7 
PROFITABILITY TRENDS lN MANUFAcruRING: 1990-2002 
90-96 97 98 99 20 01 02 Avg. 
Debt-equity ratio 301.7 396.3 303.0 214.7 210.6 182.2 135.4 
Operating income 7.1 8.3 6.1 6.6 7.4 5.5 6.7 
to sales ratio 
Interest expenses -5.7 -6.4 -9.0 -6.9 -4.7 -4.2 -2.6 
to sales rat10 
Or이n없y income 2.1 -0.3 -1.9 1.7 1.3 0.4 4.7 
to sales ratio 
Source: The Bank of Korea. Financial Statement Analysis. Vartous Years. 
in 암le corporate sector. 
Top 30 large Chaebol’s debt-equity ratios has fa11en from 519.0 
percent in 1997 to 171.2 percent in 2001 according to Korea Fair 
Trade Commission. The overall performance in m하1Ufacturìng sector 
shows a1so signs of improvemen t. The overall debt-equi양 ratio has 
fal1en from 396.3 percent in 1997 to 135.4 percent in 2002 as 
shown in Table 7. 
The collapse of Deawoo in 1999 was the largest corporate failure 
in Korea given its huge liabilities ($74 billion or 18% of GNP) and 
large scope of its domestic and overseas operation. Even after the 
1997 crisis. Daewoo exp윈lded and borrowed aggressively increasing 
its debt-equi양 ratio from 474 percent at end-1997 to 527 percent 
at end-1998. 
The slow progress in corporate reforms could have been the 
product of two factors. The first factor is 야le nature of banking 
sector. which is still the largest creditor to troubled companies. 
Because of higher government shares in m없ly restructured banks. 
the decision has been slow 윈ld less transparent than being 
desired. The second factor has something to do with the lack of 
explicit standard for decision on corporate bankruptcy. While 
Daewoo exited. Hyundai’s problem was rnitigated by the govem-
ment. One of the most important lessons is that we can draw from 
삼le recent Korean experience of corporate reform is the fact that a 
c1ear objec디ve system of corporate bankruptcy must be not on1y 
enacted but a1so be practiced by law so that crowding out capital 
and labor by the bankrupt companies can be avoided. 
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C. R걷{onn ín Labor Relatíons 
Industrial relations in Korea had been transformed from a 
repressive regime to a confrontational one after 1987 when the 
democracy movement was at its peak. Choi and Kim (2002) points 
out that the unions were concentrated ín the Chaebols (business 
conglomerates) and large companies earning non-competitive rents. 
and they were mostly buffered from market discipline. 
After president Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated in February 1998. 
his govemment established Tripar디te Commission among labor. 
business and govemment benchmarkin당 the 1995 social pact in 
Mexico. There were two national unions. Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions (FKTU) and Korea Confederation of Trade Uníons 
(KCTU) ,md. therefore. both participated in the Commission. The 
latter (KCTU) was not recognized as legal entity until the 
establishment of the T디partite Commission because multiple unions 
were banned even at the nation,ù level. But the severe nature of 
the financial crisis made the Korean govemment to recognize it as 
another counterpaπ to form a social consensus. 
While the Govemment intended to make the Commission a 
consulta1ion body. the unions sought to use it to expand [ts 
political influence. The existence of two opposing federations of 
trade unions made the Commission difficult forming any kind of 
consensus. KCTU ultimately walked out from the Commissìon 
in 1998 íln protest to the opposition by the Ministry of Justice 
against teacher's right to organize union and the unemployed 
workers right to join industrial unions. But given that unions 
represented only 13 percent of all employees. the unions attempts 
to protect their interests often conflicted with public interests. 
Under the c디ppled Commission. labor market restructurtng has 
been implemented in order to improve flexibili양 in labor markct. to 
supplement unemployment policy and to promote harmonious 
workplace partnership. As a policy to promote flexible labor market. 
a law on layoffs of redundant workers was enacted in early 19Ø8. 
However. the actual implementa디on of redundancy layoff encounter-
ed signifìcant difficulty because it was always debatable whether a 
firm had exhausted all other options to avoid a layoff. or whether a 
firm hadl acted in good faith. πle incident of Hyundai Motor Co. 
illustrates this difficulty. It announced a layoff of over 8.000 
workers in March 1998 when it was opera디ng at a very low 40% 
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TABLE 8 
S TATISTICS OF UNION AcrfVITY AND EMPLOYMENT IN S ECTORS 
WITH STRONG UNIONS 
(A) Strikes by Issue in 야le 1990s 
1991 1993 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Wage ìncreases 132 66 18 28 40 47 59 44 
Unpaìd ages/layoffs 12 12 3 26 22 9 6 2 
Collective agreements 90 66 51 57 89 167 149 249 
(Employment Issues) I 34 14 6 10 47 27 21 19 
(B) Union Acti찌ty. 1995-2000 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number o[ Unions 6605 6424 5733 5560 5637 5698 6150 n.a. 
Union Membership~ 1615 1599 1484 1402 1481 1527 1569 n.a. 
Strikes 88 85 78 129 198 250 235 321 
Strike Paπicipants~ 50 79 44 146 92 178 89 94 
Workdays Lost3 393 893 445 1452 1366 1894 1083 1579 
(C) Employment in Sectors with Strong Unions (1 .000 persons)4 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
30 Largest Chaebols 893 940 937 808 763 741 
Public Enterprìses 250 255 260 253 237 232 
Financial Sector 418 441 450 411 392 388 
Notes : 1. Includes issues on work conditions. workloads. redundancy layoffs. 
layoffs in M&As. contract buyouts. M&As. work assignments. and 
promotions. 
2. Unit is 1.000 persons. 
3. Unit ís 1.000 man*days. 
4. A11 employment figures are October figures ín each year. 
Source: The Ministry o[ Labor and the Korea Labor Institute. 
utilization rate. But. in the end. the case was fina11y closed wi야1 
the layoff of 277 employees. on only 10 percent of the initia1 
number intended. As a result. “ honorary retirement" has become 
the 1:)φical mode of layoffs despite its high costs in the 
restructuring of financia1 sector and public enterp다ses as noted by 
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Choi andl Kim (2002). 
The unemp10yment policy which was formedl between the 
government 없ld unions in the Commission was imp1emented as a 
fonn of emergency social relief. It included wage subsidies for 
job-sharing and reemployment of laid-off workers. It also included a 
subsidized 10an program for new smal1 business some of which 
were in the form of venture businesses. In the end. these programs 
failed to offer a permanent solution and provided only temporaπ 
relief. The last element of reforms in labor market was workplace 
partnership advocated by President Kim. But the lack of market 
disciplinε in industrial relations in Korea has weakened the 
mechani딩m. Choi and Kim (2002) notes that the governments effort 
to promote the workplace partnership never went further than a 
mere politic외 C잉npaign. The pe:rformance in labor relations after 
the financial crisis in 1997 is summarized in Table 8. Strikes 
demanding wage increases declined sharply in 1997 but steadJy 
increasedl over time after 1998. 80th number of unions and union 
membership have increased slowly since 1998. But emp10yments in 
30 1argest Chaebols. public enterprises and financial sector have 
declined steadily since 1997. 
D. Rising Inequality 
One of the most serious consequences of the financial crisis in 
Korea has been widening inequality in wages. income. and wealth 
distribution. Choi and Kim (2002) reports that in 1998 the bottom 
20 percent lost in nominal terms while the top 40 percent gained ‘ 
and those in top decile realized strong gains in 1999. which ma.y 
have reflected the ski11-biased labor demand shift during the ICT 
boom. The rising wage inequality has been led to rising income 
inequality. According to Lee (2002), the Gini coefficient of housc 
hold income increased sharply from 0.363 in 1997 to 0 .404 in 
1998. 
As ShOWll in Table 9. the percentage of the middle class has 
been significantly reduced by a11 of the four definitions he used 
The table also shows that more 1 ’eop1e slipped into the lower class 
rather than ascended to the upper class. He a1so reports the rising 
inequaliη of wealth distribution. Gini coefficients of net worth and 
financia1 assets including insurance policy ho1ding. and ÍÌnancia1 
assets exclu띠ng insurance policy ho1dings have a11 increased from 
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TABLE 9 
SIZE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND INEQ내LIπ 
OFWI없LTH DISTRlBUTION (GINI COEFFICIENT) 
Definition 1 (%) DeflnJtion 1 (%) Definltion 1 (%) Definition 1 (%) 
Year Lower Mlddle Upper Lower Mlddle Upper Lower Mlddle Upper Lower Mld며.e Upper 
Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class Class 
1993 33.5 32.5 34.0 26.0 44.0 30.1 17.4 59.6 23.0 17.4 72.2 10.4 
1994 35.7 3 1.2 33.2 26.6 45.0 2 1.2 17.8 6 1.2 28.5 17.8 72.6 9 .9 
1995 38.2 29.1 30.5 28.6 4 1.8 26.4 19.3 58.5 20.2 19.3 70.8 9 .0 
1996 36.0 3 1.0 33.0 22.8 43.7 28.6 18.1 60.8 2 1.2 18.1 73.9 8.0 
1997 36.8 30.5 32.7 27.5 13.6 29.0 18.7 58.7 22.5 18.7 7 1.6 9.6 
1998 38.8 24.6 36.6 3 1.8 35.9 32.3 2 1.0 53.0 26.0 2 1.0 66.6 13.4 
Year 
















































Notes: The figures are based on equiv외ent incomes. The middle class 1s 
defined differently across the four categortes of definitions. In 
Definition 1. it 1s defined as households whose incomes r없1ge from 
80 to 125% of the median íncome. In Definítion 2 . households 
eaming 66.7 to 133.3% of the median income are grouped under the 
middle class. In Definitions 3 and 4. a 5- to 150% range 하1d a 50 
to 200% range are used. respectively. 
Source: Lee (2002). 
1997 to 1998. 
In a recent report. Yoo (2003) has estimated ch킹1ge in income 
inequ허i양 in Korea by compu디ng Gini coefficients between 1996 
and 2000. Following Luxembroug Income study. he estimated Gini 
coefficients of both market income 하ld disposable income from 
Family Expenditure Suruey by National Statistical Office. As 
summarized in Table 10. 바le Gini coefficient of market income has 
deteriorated from 0 .329 in 1996 to 0.404 in 2000. And that of 
INTERDEPENDENCY IN EAST ASIA 
TABLE 10 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND RELATlVE POVERTY RATIO 
BEFORE AND AITER 1997 CRISIS 
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Relative Poverty Ratio (%): Market Income 
Proportion of Households with Income 









Notes: 1) Market income is defined as the sum of wage income. self-employed 
income. income from secondary work. property income and private 
transfer income. 
2) Disposable income is defined as market income plus public transfer 
income net of sociaI security contribution and d.irect income tax. 
Source: Yoo (2003. Table 2. 3. and 6). 
disposable income has also deteriorated from 0.326 to 0.389. When 
both incomes were adjusted by equiv외ence index by the formula. 
Incomej(Number oJ household members).O.5 still both Gini coefficient 
of market income and that of disposable income have deteriorated 
from 0.302 to 0 .374 없ld from 0.298 to 0.358 respectively du디ng 
the same period. 
VI. Conclusion 
Several important lessons can be drawn from the Korean 
experience of post-crisis macroeconomic a여usbnent and refurm 
programs. Regarding 암le IMF-mandated programs. the high ìnterest 
rate policy and the tight fiscal policy at the ìnitial stage of financial 
crisis should not be regarded as a ready-made prescription to all 
crisis-inflicted economies. The Fund programs need to be shaped 
out more flextbly not only in terms of contents but also in terms of 
timing 
The heavy reliance of Korea’s recovery progr없ns on the injection 
of public funds seems to have been inevitable. Chopra et a l. (2002) 
have argued that the large-scale injection of public funds was 
necessaη in Korea because the institutional investors and small 
shareholder who held the majority of commercial bank’s shares 
could not be relied on. since the former were themselves :in 
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financia1 distress while the 1atter had a collective action prob1em. 
However , the use of funds was not fully transparent and , therefore , 
can be subject to p이itica1 debate in the next regimes. The impacts 
of banking reforms , corporate reforms and labor reforms cannot be 
assessed fully yet. But, many reform programs lost effectiveness 
due to their political nature rather than their economic efficiency. 
The painful experience of Korea’s post-crisis macroeconomic 
a이ustment and structural reforms seem to have received both 
positive and mixed evaluations. The overal1 macro economic 
environment in the post-crisis peπod has been stabilized. The 
Korean economy seems to have recovered some of its gro\\πh 
poten디als and competi디veness. The movement in the overall 
producti찌ty indicators such as labor productivi양 없ld tot외 factor 
productivity seem to validate this judgment even 야lOugh there was 
a structural break in 1997-8. However. it has long way to go 
because both financial sector reforms and corporate resσucturíng 
are far from being completed. Most of 려1， the sharp reduction in 
real investment during the crisis period of 1997 and 1998 by -2.2 
percent and - 21.2 percent has not been fully recovered during the 
post-CríSiS recovery period of 1999-2002 with the annual average 
gro\\πh rate of 4.5 percent. 
The shift from corporate-loan regime to consumer-loan regime 
under delayed financial reform progr없n has created another type of 
moral hazard. As a result of unchecked rapid expansion of 
consumer credit card companies , it is reported that there are 3.6 
million delinquent credit card holders. The delinquency ratio of 
consumer credit cards increased from 9.8 percent in March 2003 to 
11.74 percent in November 2003. 
The unemployment rate of young workers of age 15-29 years old 
has increased from 6.6 percent in September 2003 to 8.0 percent 
in December 2003. The number of unemployed of age 15-29 years 
old reached 394 ,000 persons which is more than half of the total 
unemployed (792.000 persons). On the ride of industrial structure , 
the p이anza디on between large survived top 5 Chaebols and the rest 
of firms has been expanded because more than half of the non-top 
5 Chaebols have been eliminated from the market after 1997 
financial crisis. And therefore the excess competi디on regime seems 
to have been permanently displaced. But there seems to be no 
substitute regime to replace the excess compe디디ve model. 
In addition , because some of the incidents and the programs are 
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seem to have been p이itically rnotivated. they may have to be 
reevaluated in the years to com당. Most of all the lack of strong 
p이itical :leadership and the continued political instability after the 
financial crisis together with the North-Korea’s nuclear issue seem 
to exist as a bottleneck for resurning the pre-crisis path of higher 
growth 
(Received 19 January 2004: RevÍ..-':;c:’d 23 July 2004) 
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